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Changing Perspectives on the Capital 
Investment Process 
William K. Hall* 
The environment within which institutions undertake 
commercial and industrial activity changes both as a 
result of decisions dependent on the institution itself 
and as a result of decisions independent of the institution. 
In recent years many of these changes have resulted in 
changing perspectives on the range of criteria which 
should be considered when determining how and where 
large corporations should invest their money. This paper 
examines these changes in corporate practice and 
identifies the cumulative results of these changes in the 
environment of corporate activity. The paper also ex- 
amines some of the key elements in new approaches 
which corporations are adopting to capital investment 
decisions by utilizing data on a broadly based research 
project which examines in depth the capital investment/ 
resource allocation processes of five large, worldwide. 
manufacturing firms. The subject is of vital importance 
to large and small businesses, both because of the crucial 
importance of investment decisions and because of the 
importance for future strategic planning of identifying 
the environment within which corporate activities take 
place. 
Despite more than a half century of thinking and 
research, the question as to how large corporations 
should invest their money still remains one of the most 
challenging issues facing corporate management today. 
It is obvious that the way in which this question is 
resolved in practice has a major impact on corporate 
profitability and performance. Moreover, the effective- 
ness of this resource allocation process also has major 
implications for the performance of capital markets and 
for the contribution of the private sector to a growing 
number of stakeholders-employees, shareholders, cus- 
tomers and the public-at-large. 
There is now growing evidence that large firms have 
begun to think and act differently with respect to 
capital investment decisions during the past decade. 
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These changes in corporate practice have not been 
revolutionary; instead, they have been slow and evolu- 
tionary, responding to some fundamental, underlying . 





Slower, erratic growth in customer markets; 
Limited availability of capital, raw materials, new 
technology, and managerial resources; 
Increased regulatory constraints on product perfor- 
mance and production technology; and 
Increased worldwide competition, with firms man- 
aged for capital gains competing against firms (and 
nations) who are primarily interested in employment/ 
balance of payments gains. 
The cumulative result of these four trends has forced 
progressive firms to add more se&vity and ~&US to 
their capital investment/resource allocation decisions. 
Through increased selectivity, these firms are attempting 
to concentrate their resources and skills on a more 
limited set of investment activities, giving up the idea 
that they should be ‘all things to all people’. Through 
increased &CUS, these firms are attempting to manage 
the selected investment activities with precision, finding 
ways to promote and protect a competitive advantage 
in an increasingly hostile environment. As a result, 
traditional fmancial-based, incremental approaches to 
resource allocation decisions are being supplemented or 
even replaced in many corporations, 
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the key 
elements in these new approaches. The data came from 
an ongoing research project into the general manage- 
ment process in large, complex corporations, and the 
conclusions are based upon indepth examinations of 
the capital investment/resource allocation process in five 
large, worldwide manufacturing firms. The paper will 
first examine the traditional view of capital expenditure 
analysis and then discuss the new revisions and alterna- 
tives as they are currently being implemented. 
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The Traditional View 
The traditional view of capital expenditure analysis 
grew out of the microeconomist’s theory of the firm 
and theory of investment in the 1930s. Refined by 
applied research at schools of business administration 
and by application in a large number of corporations, 




That the relevant costs and revenues for evaluating 
a capital investment project are the incremental costs 
and revenues resulting from implementation of the 
investment decision; 
That these relevant costs and revenues should be 
combined to project the incremental cash flows 
flowing to and from the investment over the pro- 
ject’s life; and 
That those investments whose discounted net present 
value (at the firm’s total cost of capital) exceeds zero 
will increase the value of the firm (to the share- 
holders). 
In terms of the neoclassical theory of the firm, there is 
little argument that this view of the investment process 
is correct, and much work was done during the late 
1960s to refine it, using computer models and proba- 
bilistic risk analysis. Further sophistication in the ap- 
proach was added in the early I97Os, tying capital 
investment decisions to the market performance of the 
firm’s equity, using the capital asset pricing model and 
related theoretical concepts. 
The problem comes, however, when one tries to 
‘operationalize’ this approach in making real capital 
expenditure decisions in complex, multiproduct, multi- 
level corporations. In this environment, forecasts of 
incremental costs and revenues are made in an environ- 
ment of great uncertainty, and risks relevant to the 
project’s success are frequently-impossible to quantify.’ 
As one chief executive officer interviewed by this author 
pointed out, 
The unforeseen event will occur again, just as the oil embargo 
of 1973 and the worldwide recession of 1975 . . . And no econo- 
metric model or economist has the power to accurately forecast 
such uncertainties . . . despite our use of increasingly sophisticated 
tools, it’s still a lot like rolling dice. 
Moreover, investment decisions in this uncertain, 
rapidly changing environment have a sociopolitical 
dimension which is at least as great as the economic 
dimension. This sociopolitical dimension arises out of 
the fact that resource allocation decisions in the large 
firm are not made by a single, omnipotent individual 
performing analyses and making decisions. Instead the 
resource allocation process involves a complex web of 
interactions among different organizational levels, dif- 
ferent functions and different people. Since the ‘actors’ 
in this web possess different information and different 
objectives, any attempt at concensus invariably results 
in the limited consideration of investment alternatives 
and biased financial analyses. Consider, for instance, the 
following statement by a senior corporate officer : 
The danger of incremental cash flow analysis is that it invariably 
leads you to make the next round of investment . . . somebody 
can always stand up and make a convincing case to justify how 
the incremental revenues for his pet project support the incre- 
mental investment. 
The following quote by a divisional general manager is 
even more graphic: 
When a project comes in at an estimated 50 per cent return, we 
cut the estimate down . . . the figure might go out (for corporate 
approval) at 30 per cent . . . And this practice works the other 
way too. ‘Although a (recent) project looked like 8 per cent on 
paper, I put it through at 12 per cent . . And we haven’t had a 
capital expenditure request rejected in 8 years.2 
In this environment it seems apparent that the analytical 
power of a tool like discounted cash flow analysis is far 
less significant than the managerial power which can be 
employed to get the relevant investment alternatives 
generated, approved, and properly executed in a com- 
plex organization. Modern views of the investment 
process are coming to recognize that this managerial 
power can be either substantive or contextual: 
Sttlstantive Pozver: Power to influence the nature and 
content of information incorporated into the capital 
investment decision process. 
Contextual Power: Power to influence the nature and 
content of the managerial structure and systems 
(organizational, measurement and reward) within 
which investment decisions are made. 
Moreover, this managerial power can be possessed at a 
number of levels within the firm, by the corporate 
management, corporate staff, group or divisional (inte- 
grating) management, divisional staff, or middle (func- 
tional) management. For example, in one large firm 
studied by this author, the middle managers in market- 
ing and manufacturing possessed most of the rubstantive 
power for facility investment decisions. As a result, they 
were able to initiate analyses and control the alternatives 
which were subjected to detailed scrutiny. In this same 
firm, the corporate staff possessed most of the contextual 
power through their tight control of expenditure budgets 
and through the divisional measurement and reward 
system which they had developed. Interesting enough, 
top management in this same firm was left with very 
limited power to influence the investment process, 
other than their ability to place key people into the line 
and staff organizations. As a result, after playing ‘devil’s 
advocate’ with large investment projects submitted to 
them for approval, they approved almost all decisions 
within the limits of an aggregate capital expenditure 
ceiling (as imposed by the corporate staff). The result 
was a fairly ‘even’ allocation of capital across divisions, 
geographic markets, and functions; an allocation that 
left people happy in the short run but profits down in 
the long run. 
To summarize, the argument being created here is two- 
fold : 
(1) The capital investment process in large firms today 
is more dependent upon managerial power than it is 
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(2) 
upon the analytical power of new tools and tech- 
niques. 




The substantive (information) content; 
The contextual (structure/systems) setting; and 
The organizational levels at which these sub- 
stantive/contextual decisions and tradeoffs are 
made. 
We shall now proceed to discuss some ways in which 
these dimensions are shifting as large firms attempt to 
bring focus and selectivity back into their resource 
allocation processes. 
Modern Views 
In analyzing these changing perspectives toward the 
capital expenditure decision, the first major finding is 
that the types of substantive inputs used in allocating 
resources have shifted. The incorporation of more 
information than simple forecasts of incremental costs 
and revenues is being done in most firms (including all 
five in this study) to shape both the type of alternatives 
being considered and the way in which these alternatives 
are being evaluated. 
In three of the firms studied by this author, the ‘project 
by project’ approach to resource allocation had been 
displaced by a strategic approach. In these firms, detailed 
business-level strategy statements were used to focus 
important investment decisions, while ruling out others 
that didn’t fit the stated business strategy, regardless of 
their ‘paper profitability’. As one chief planning officer 
commented : 
Allocating resources to investments without a sound concept of 
divisional and corporate strategy is a lot like throwing darts in a 
darkened room. 
Another CEO supported this view when he observed: 
You don’t do things because they meet your financial analysis 
criteria . . . you do things because they are central to your strategy. 
At best, financial analysis can help you understand the strategic 
issues better, or force you to go back to your people and tell 
them the project must be executed better to get an acceptable 
return. 
In the above three firms and in two others, additional 
information on competition and product/market posi- 
tioning was inputted into the analyses. The objective of 
this market-oriented approach was to focus attention on 
market segmentation and on ways of using scarce 
resources to promote or protect a long-term competitive 
advantage with a segment. In these firms, market share 
and projected market share growth rates were as impor- 
tant in evaluating projects as discounted cash flow ROI. 
It was the opinion of these firms that long-term product/ 
market position would give long-term capital gains, a 
concept with some recent empirical support.3 
The question wh’ h ic must be raised, of course, is where 
these substantive inputs can (and should) come from. 
The traditional view of the decentralized organization 
suggests that they should originate at the divisional or 
business unit level. Corporate management, as the 
argument goes, has neither the time or expertise to input 
substance into the decision process. In fact, however, 
corporate management made significant substantive 
inputs into the investment process in three of the 
organizations selected for indepth study, once through 
the corporate staff and twice through the CEO himself: 
0) 
(2) 
In one organization the corporate planning staff 
performed the competitive analysis and then cate- 
gorized the firm’s businesses into strategic classes for 
investment analysis. Business unit managers were 
then told to evaluate their investment projects using 
these corporate analyses and characterizations. 
In another organization, the CEO himself identified 
the key issues and (through a special taskforce) con- 
ducted most of the analysis on a major strategic 
investment. In his opinion, personal reinvolvement 
in the substance of the resource allocation process 
was essential to promote the firm’s strategy at the 
particular time of study. 
Thus, based upon the limited samples selected for 
indepth study in this research, it would appear that new 
types of substantive inputs based upon strategic con- 
siderations are dominating the classical financial inputs 
into the resource allocation process. Moreover, it would 
appear that these substantive inputs are coming from 
higher levels of the organization, involving both cor- 
porate management and corporate staff. This latter 
observation represents a major shift from the 1960s 
when corporate functions came to be viewed as pri- 
marily ‘administrative’ and ‘integrative’ through the 
establishment of context. 
How then, one might ask, has contextual polver shifted in 
the late 197Os? One major change in two of the organ- 
izations under study involves the establishment of 
‘strategy centers’ or ‘strategic business units’4 for the 
purposes of resource allocation. In these organizations, 
the measurement and reward systems for individual 
strategy centers are being adopted to fit the particular 
role the centers are supposed to be playing within the 
overall corporate strategy. As such, the context is being 
tailored to promote certain kinds of investment projects, 
while filtering out other types of proposals. For example, 
one firm in the sample chose to measure a particular 
strategy center on short term cash generation; using 
this criterion, the firm has been able to promote cost 
cutting investments in the division while discouraging 
new business ventures, a pattern of resource allocation 
consistent with the divisional and corporate strategy. 
A second contextual change in four of the five organiza- 
tions has been the movement away from rigid, ‘MBOish’ 
goal-setting downward through the firm. Instead, cor- 
porate and divisional goals are enunciated and com- 
municated in broad, strategic terms. Within these 
expansive, top-down strategic guidelines, operating 
managers are expected to execute investment projects 
selectively, focusing their group or divisional resources 
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on projects where they can find and maintain a com- 
petitive advantage. The common desire in these firms 
is to force strategic thinking downward, while adding 
stronger ‘strategic controls’ to monitor performance at 
the corporate level. Specifically, the attempt has been 
to add a strategic orientation to the management process, 
supplementing the traditional operational orientation 
imposed by rigid goal-setting and budgetary controls, 
an attempt which lends support to Quinn’s recent 
study :5 
Effective top executives in huger enterprises typically state a few 
broad goals . . . They eschew the gimickry of simplistic ‘formal 
planning’ or ‘MB0 approaches for setting major goals . . . 
Instead they tend to develop such goals through very compli- 
cated, largely political, consensus-building processes that are 
outside the structure of most formal management systems. 
The third contextual change noted in this study is change 
itself. All five organizations made one or more signifi- 
cant structural shifts during the period of observation, 
even though only one shifted corporate strategy during 
this period. Two adopted the ‘management committee’ 
approach to the organization of their executive offices, 
with the rationale in both cases based on the need for 
stronger evaluation and co-ordination of operating units 
and on stronger strategic planning. One added a new 
corporate staff group directly responsible for strategic 
planning (two others had added such a staff in the early 
1970s). Moreover, three firms in the sample consolidated 
related divisions and functions into more focused groups 
directed by senior officers. In all three cases, this group 
structure was designed to consolidate, co-ordinate and 
focus divisional plans and to reduce the span of control 
of executive officers, freeing their time to work on 
externalities and broad policy issues.6 
In all of the structural shifts observed, the common 
attempt was to obtain more focus and strategic inputs 
to the resource allocation process, while attempting to 
avoid the overcommitment of top management re- 
sources to this process. Interestingly enough, all of the 
firms projected further corporate re-organizations as 
they experimented with substance/context tradeoffs at 
various management levels. As one senior officer com- 
mented, 
Complexity and change will force most well managed companies 
to live in semi chaos for the next few years . . . organizational 
stability will be an accident, as these firms continually try to 
outstretch and out maneuver their competition. 
Summary 
The purpose of this paper has been to examine changes 
in the resource allocation process as large, complex 
organizations attempt to bring strategic focus and selec- 
tivity to this process. Based upon the preliminary evi- 




Strategic criteria are displacing traditional financial 
criteria as the driving mechanisms behind the 
resource allocation/capital investment process; 
Corporate managements are experimenting with 
new concepts and with new substance/context trade- 
offs at corporate, divisional, and middle management 
levels as they attempt to balance their strategic needs 
with external opportunities and uncertainties. 
Since it appears likely that these experiments will con- 
tinue into the 1980s it is essential for general manage- 
ment researchers to become more involved in process 
research, to ensure that the experiments are properly 
executed, but more importantly, to ensure that general- 
izations and interpretations are properly assessed and 
disseminated. There is little question that the ‘name of 
the game’ is changing in corporate practice, and patterns 
of management research must change too in order to 
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